For personal use. Only reproduce with permission from The Lancet. The CSTE position statement and case definition has not been fully adopted by the CDC. "A final version is expected to be published soon in an upcoming Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report", Parashar told TLID.
Coinciding with the revised exclusion criteria for SARS, CDC adjusted the recommended timing of collection of the convalescent-phase serum sample, because in some cases antibody response to SARS-coronavirus infection may not be detectable until 28 days after the onset of illness.
CDC has made reagents for SARScoronavirus antibody testing available to state public-health laboratories.
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The interim US surveillance case definition for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was revised in July to allow for exclusion of cases with negative convalescent-phase serology. Using the revised criteria, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) excluded nearly half of the 418 reported cases of SARS in the USA to date.
According to CDC epidemiologist Umesh Parashar (Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, National Center for Infectious Disease, Atlanta, GA, USA), "In the end, we only have eight cases of SARS confirmed by serology in the USA. None of the suspect SARS cases to date were positive".
"WHO has repeatedly asked countries to reclassify their SARS cases and to discard them only if they are fully explained by another cause", WHO spokesperson Maria Cheng told TLID. "Reclassification also refers to upgrading suspect to probable cases on the basis of positive laboratory tests."
On June 11, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), a US professional publichealth organisation, issued a policy statement calling on the CDC to take specific steps that would improve surveillance for SARS in the USA ( h t t p : / / w w w . c s t e . o r g / P S / 2 0 0 3 pdfs/2003finalpdf/03id12%20SARS200 3_final.pdf). CSTE recommends in the statement that the US surveillance case definition be revised and split into two cases definitions, one for SARS reports under investigation and one for reports of SARS-coronavirus disease.
"The more sensitive SARS reports under investigation reflect a group where you want to detect these cases and identify them so you can institute infection control and other measures to prevent transmission, but you don't necessarily want to report them as cases of SARS", said Parashar, who coauthored the position statement with James Hadler (Infectious Diseases Division, Connecticut Department of Public Health, Hartford, CT, USA).
In addition to a revised case definition, CSTE requests in the statement that the CDC include cases of SARS-coronavirus disease as a
USA reworks its case definition for SARS

Redesign proposed for UK infrastructure to fight infection
Newsdesk Testing for SARS CDC/Anthony Sanchez Infectious diseases services in the UK would not currently be able to cope with a future emergent infection on the scale of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), a UK House of Lords committee report has claimed.
The "Fighting infection" report ( h t t p : / / w w w . p a r l i a m e n t . t h estationery-office.co.uk) from the Select Committee on Science and Technology claims that while the UK "has not experienced major epidemics of infection in recent years, this owes as much to good fortune as to good management", and calls on UK government to make arrangements for formal collaboration and lines of accountability. Foremost among these suggestions are proposed regional "infection centres" to create a critical mass of expertise and high quality research, and to bridge existing gaps between different areas of specialty, particularly in the reporting of emerging infection. It is likely that such centres would represent a commitment to consultant expansion. Some experts, however, are sceptical as to whether such centres, and the speed with which they are created, really would be able to maintain expertise across diverse departments or whether the move would represent merely a "breaking up" of the existing body, the Health Protection Agency (HPA). The HPA, which covers England and Wales and was put in place in April this year, evolved from the Public Health Laboratory Service. Maria Zambon (HPA, London, UK) voices a common concern that, "whilst [the creation of a new agency] does offer many opportunities to create new structures and improve control of infectious disease in the UK, there is a significant risk that triedand-tested structures that work well may be at risk through changing personnel, information flow, laboratory infrastructure, and unclear responsibilities".
The bovine spongiform encephalitis outbreak in recent UK history showed that there is much scope for greater collaboration between public health services and veterinary agencies.
Comparisons with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) are likely. The USA has witnessed a strengthening of its public health structures as a consequence of the international bioterrorist threat, but would the UK be able to match its intensity of activity?
